In this paper we provide a inductive proof system for abstract non-interference which fits in every field of computer science where we are interested in observing how different program's data interfere with each other. The idea is to abstract from language-based security and consider generically data as distinguished between internal (that has to be protected by the program) and observable. In this more general context we derive a proof system which allows to characterise abstract non-interference properties inductively on the syntax of programs. We finally show how this framework can be instantiated to language-based security.
Introduction
attacker that does not impose any observational or complexity restriction on the attackers' power. This means that, in this model, the attackers have full power , namely they are modeled without any limitation in their quest to obtain confidential information. For this reason non-interference, as defined in the literature, is an extremely restrictive policy. The problem of refining this kind of security policy has been addressed by many authors as a major challenge in language-based information-flow security [22] . Refining security policies means weakening standard non-interference checks, in such a way that these restrictions can be used in practice or can reveal more information about how information flows in programs.
In the literature, we can find mainly two different approaches for weakening non-interference: By constraining the power of the attacker (from the observational or the computational point of view), or by allowing some confidential information to flow (the so called declassification). There are several works dealing with both these approaches, but to the best of our knowledge, only one of these can at the same time characterize both the power of the attacker's model and the private information that can flow: abstract non-interference [13, 15] . Such a model allows us to understand the intuitive relation existing between the attacker's model and information released: The more powerful is the attacker, the less information can be kept private. Abstract non-interference captures a weaker form of noninterference, where non-interference is made parametric relatively to some abstract property of input/output behaviour. Consider the following program written in a simple imperative language, where the while-statement iterates until x 1 is 0. Suppose x 1 is a confidential variable and x 2 is a public variable: while x 1 > 0 do x 2 := x 2 + 2; x 1 := x 1 − 1 endw
In standard non-interference there is an implicit flow from x 1 to x 2 , due to the while-statement, since x 2 changes depending on the initial value of x 1 . This represents the case where no restriction is considered on the power of an attacker. However, suppose that the attacker can observe only the the parity property of public variables (x 2 ). It is clear that this property cannot be changed by the execution of the program. This means that there's no information-flow from private to public if the attacker can only observe parity. Abstract non-interference generalizes this idea to arbitrary abstractions of the semantics of a programming language and to arbitrary context, where the non-interference analysis is fundamental. This provides both a characterization of the degree of dependency between different components of a program, relatively to what an observer can analyze about its input/output information flow, and the possibility for certifying code relatively to some weaker form of non-interference.
This problem has been attacked first by Cohen [7] . In his definition of selective dependency, he considers more general situations, where only a portion of private information effects the observable data; as it happens in the following example:
l := |l| * Sign(h)
where |l| is the absolute value of l, while Sign(h) is the sign of h. In this case only the sign of h has effect on the value of l. Hence, if we do not have any restriction on the observational power of the attacker, then we can conclude that only the sign of the private input can be detected, since it is the only portion of private data that flows in the public output. Moreover, if the attacker can only observe the absolute value of public data, then this assignment is secure. These considerations suggested to model a notion of non-interference where it is also possible to characterize which portion of confidential data interferes with the observable output. This requires a considerable extension of Cohen's original approach by selective dependencies. For instance the two characterizations above are combined in such a way that the program fragment l := l * h 2 can be certified as secure if the attacker can only observe the parity of the public variable l and we are interested only in keeping private the sign of h. In this expression, it is the semantics of the program that creates a implicit semantic firewall between public and secret variables that protects the sign of h. Therefore, in the more general context, given the observer's model, abstract non-interference allows to characterise, not only if there is an information-flow, but also what is flowing, when it turns out that the program violates non-interference.
The problem. Abstract non-interference is based on the general idea that data are distinguished into two classes: what is observable (public in the security context) and what has to remain internal to the program (private in security). This classification is parametric on the model of an observer, which is an abstract interpretation of the semantics of the program. A program satisfies the abstract non-interference condition relatively to some given abstraction (observer) if the abstraction obfuscates any possible interference between internal and observable data. In [13, 15] the authors introduce a step-by-step weakening of Goguen and Meseguer's non-interference by specifying abstract non-interference as a property of the semantics of the program. The idea of modeling observers as abstract domains provides advanced methods for deriving these observers by systematically transforming the corresponding abstract domains. An algebraic characterization of the most precise harmless observer, i.e., the most precise abstraction for which the program satisfies the abstract non-interference property, is given as a fixpoint domain construction. This abstraction, as well as any abstractions for which the program satisfies abstract non-interference, is both a model of an harmless observer and a certificate for the non-interference degree of the program. At this point, the problem we want to investigate is how it is possible to compose abstract non-interference certificates. Clearly we would like to make this composition systematic, and therefore we aim to characterise a proof system, inductive on the syntax. This proof system would allow to directly derive abstract non-interference certificates only for elementary statements and then to obtain more complex certificates by using the rules of the proof system. In this way, we can think of using abstract non-interference in automatic program certification mechanisms, such as in proof-carrying code architectures [20] and in type-based verification algorithms.
The logical approach to secure information flow is not new. In [11] dynamic logic is used for characterizing secure information flows, deriving a theorem prover for checking programs. In [1] an axiomatic approach for checking secure information flows is provided. In particular the authors syntactically derive the secure information flows that may happen during the execution. Both these works don't characterize the power of the attacker.
Main contribution and structure of the paper. The aim of this paper is to provide a compositional proof-system for certifying abstract noninterference in programming languages. In this way we can prove, inductively on the syntax of programs, properties of abstract non-interference relatively to some given abstraction of its input/output. Abstractions are specified in the standard abstract interpretation [9] framework. The proof systems is based on the derivation of abstract non-interference assertions, which specify the non-interference degree of a program relatively to a given model of an attacker and the proof-system specifies how these assertions can be composed in a syntax-directed a la Hoare deduction of abstract noninterference. The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we provide the necessary formal background in abstract interpretation and in program semantics, explaining the notation that will be used along the paper. In Sect. 3 we recall the recent generalisation [15] of abstract non-interference, which extends the notion introduced in language-based security [13] to any field of computer science where we are interested in understanding the degree of interference between two different groups of data. Sect. 4 is the core of the paper. Here we describe the proof system in the general context. In particular, by means of some examples, we explain the restrictions that we have to consider for abstract non-interference in order to being able to characterise a proof system inductive on the syntax of simple imperative programs. This section is split in several parts. In Sect 4.1 we introduce a system for the derivation of invariant properties assertions. A property is invariant if it is left unchanged by the execution of a program. This kind of properties are important for the characterisation of abstract non-interference properties when dealing with loops. In Sect. 4.2 we describe a sound proof system for abstract noninterference in the most general context possible, while in Sect.4.3 we show how we can make the system complete, losing in this case, the effectiveness of the system. Finally, in Sect. 4.4 we show how we can extend the system to non-deterministic systems. In Sect. 5 we instantiate the proof system for abstract non-interference to the particular context of language-based security. This specialisation allows also to understand why it is not possible to generate a similar system for abstract non-interference where we allow some confidential information to flow, i.e., declassified [13, 19, 3] .
This is an extended and revised version of [14] .
Preliminaries

Basic notions
Sets are usually denoted with capital letters. If S and T are sets, then ℘(S ) denotes the powerset of S , S T denotes the set-difference between S and T , S ⊂ T denotes strict inclusion, and for a function f :
We will often denote f ({x }) as f (x ). By g • f we denote the composition of the functions f and g, i.e., g • f def = λx .g(f (x )). id def = λx . x . P , ≤ denotes a poset P with ordering relation ≤, while P , ≤, ∨, ∧, ⊤, ⊥ denotes a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, lub ∨, glb ∧, greatest element (top) ⊤, and least element (bottom) ⊥. S −→T denotes the set of all functions from S to T . We use the symbol ⊑ to denote point-wise ordering between functions: If S is any set, P a poset, and f , g : S → P then f ⊑ g if for all x ∈ S , f (x ) ≤ P g(x ). Let C and A be complete lattices, then, C m −→A and C c −→A, denote, respectively, the set of all monotone and (Scott-)continuous functions from C to A. Recall that f ∈ C c −→A iff f preserves lub's of (nonempty) chains iff f preserves lub's of directed subsets, and f : C → A is (completely) additive if f preserves lub's of all subsets of C (empty set included).
Abstract interpretation basics
It is well known that abstract domains can be equivalently formulated either in terms of Galois connections or closure operators [10] . A pair of functions α : C → A and γ : A → C on posets, denoted C , α, A, γ , forms an adjunction or a Galois connection (GC) if for any x ∈ C and y ∈ A: α(x ) ≤ A y ⇔ x ≤ C γ(y). α (resp. γ) is the left-(right-)adjoint to γ (α) and it is an additive (co-additive) function. Additive and co-additive functions f admit right and left adjoint:
. If in addition for any a ∈ A: α(γ(a)) = a, then we call C , α, A, γ a Galois insertion (GI) of A in C . In GC-based abstract interpretation the concrete and abstract domains, C and A, are complete lattices [9] . An upper (lower) closure operator ρ : P → P on a poset P is monotone, idempotent, and extensive: ∀x ∈ P . x ≤ P ρ(x ) (reductive: ∀x ∈ P . x ≥ P ρ(x )). The set of all upper (lower) closure operators on P is denoted by uco(P ) (lco(P )). Let C , ≤, ∨, ∧, ⊤, ⊥ be a complete lattice. Closure operators are uniquely determined by the set of their fix-points ρ(C ). For upper closures, X ⊆ C is the set of fix-points of ρ ∈ uco(C ) iff X is a Moore-family of
In this case ρ(C ) is a complete sub-lattice of C iff ρ is additive. In the following we will find particularly convenient to identify closure operators (and therefore abstract domains) with their sets of fix-points. Dual properties can be derived for lower closures. Therefore uco(C ) is isomorphic to the so called lattice of abstract interpretations of C [10] . If C is a complete lattice then uco(C ) and lco(C ) ordered point-wise are also complete lattices. For upper closures uco(C ), ⊑, ⊔, ⊓, ⊤, id where for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C ),
Dual properties can be derived for lco(C ), ⊑, ⊔, ⊓, λx . x , λx . ⊥ . The disjunctive completion of an abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(C ) is the most abstract domain able to represent the concrete disjunction of its objects:
(ρ) = ⊔{η ∈ uco(C )|η ⊑ ρ and η is additive}. ρ is disjunctive iff (ρ) = ρ (cf. [10] ). Closure operators and partitions are related concepts. If π is a partition (viz. an equivalence relation), then [·] π is the corresponding equivalence class. A closure η ∈ uco(℘(S )) induces a partition on S : [x ] η x ∈ S , where [x ] η def = y η(x ) = η(y) . The most concrete closure that induces the same partition of values as η is Π(η) [21] . The idea is that Π(η) is the most concrete closure such that for any y ∈ Π(η)(x ): Π(η)(x ) = Π(η)(y), while in general η(y) ⊆ η(x ).
The imperative language
In this section, we introduce the syntax of a simple programming language, Imp [27] , which is a small language of while programs.
Syntax: The deterministic fragment. First of all, we list the syntactic sets associated with Imp: Values V; Truth values B = {true, false}; Variables Var ; Arithmetic expression Aexp; Boolean expression Bexp; Commands Com. We assume that the syntactic structure of numbers is given. We will use the following convention: m, n range over values V; x , y range over variables Var ; a ranges over arithmetic expression Aexp; b ranges over boolean ex-pression Bexp; c ranges over commands Com. We describe the arithmetic and boolean expressions in Aexp Bexp as follows:
Finally, for commands we have the following abstract syntax:
while ¬b do c 1 ; b := true endw Therefore, in the following we will consider the language Imp, omitting the control statement if.
Semantics. As usual the set of values V can be structured as a flat domain with additional bottom element ⊥, denoting the value of not initialized variables. In the following we will denote by Var(P ) the set of variables of the program P ∈ Imp. We consider the well-known (small-step) operational semantics of Imp, −→, in Table 1 [27] . The operational semantics naturally induces a transition relation on a set of states Σ, denoted →, specifying the relation between a state and its possible successors. Σ, → is a transition system. In this transition system, states are representations of the memory, i.e., associations between variables and values. For this reason, in the following we will denote states as tuples of values, the values associated with the variables by the given state. Therefore, if |Var(P )| = n, then Σ is a set of n-tuples of values, i.e., Σ = V n . In sake of simplicity, we denote by V x the set of values over which x can range, i.e., the domain of x . Note that, in the rules provided in Table 1 we have transitions between configurations, i.e., pairs <code,state>. In the following by P we will denote the denotational semantics of the program P . We follow Cousot's construction [8] , by defining semantics, at different levels of abstractions, as the abstract interpretation of the maximal trace semantics of a transition system associated with each well-formed program. In the following, Σ + and Σ ω def = N−→Σ denote respectively the set of finite nonempty and infinite sequences of symbols in Σ. Given a sequence σ ∈ Σ ∞ def = Σ + ∪ Σ ω , its length is denoted |σ| ∈ N ∪ {ω} and its i-th element is denoted σ i . A non-empty finite (infinite) trace σ ∈ Σ ∞ is a finite (infinite) sequence of program states where two consecutive elements are in the transition relation →, i.e., for all i < |σ|: σ i → σ i+1 . The maximal trace semantics [8] of a transition system associated with a program P is |P | 
If σ ∈ |P | + , then σ ⊣ and σ ⊢ denote respectively the final and initial state of σ, while Σ ⊢ denotes the set of initial states for P . The denotational semantics is obtained by abstracting trace semantics to the input and output states only, i.e., P = σ ⊢ , σ ⊣ σ ∈ |P | + ∪ σ ⊢ , ⊥ σ ∈ |P | ω . If the program is non deterministic, then we abuse notation by denoting the possibilistic denotational semantics by
Syntax: The non-deterministic fragment. A simple way to introduce some basic issues in order to obtain non-deterministic languages is to extend the simple imperative language Imp by an operation of non-deterministic choice. We define in this way the language Nd-Imp, whose commands are defined in the following way:
Clearly. we have to extend the operational semantics with the rules for the non-deterministic choice:
In this section we recall the notion of abstract non-interference [13, 15] , i.e., a weakening of non-interference given in terms of observers modelled by means of abstract interpretations of concrete semantics. We will start from standard notion on non-interference (NI for short), originally introduced in language-based security [7, 16, 22] , and then generalized to any kind of classification of data, where we are interested in understanding if a given class of data interferes with another class of data. In other words, we generalize the public/private data classification of data in language-based security to a generic observable/internal classification. Let us recall that P denotes the denotational semantics of a program P . Consider data distinguished into two classes, internal (denoted * ) and observed (denoted •). 
and n = |{x ∈ Var(P )|x is in the class C}|, we abuse notation by denoting v ∈ C the fact that v is a possible value for the vector of variables in the class C. Moreover, if x ∈ O (analogous for x ∈ I) we denote as 
A program P , satisfies non-interference between * and
Weakening Non-Interference
Consider the program P def = x := |x | * Sign(y) (seen in the introduction, where I * = {y} and I • = O • = {x }), suppose that | · | is the absolute value function and suppose Sign(y) returns the sign of y, then "only a portion of x is affected, in this case x 's sign. Imagine if an observer could only observe x 's absolute value and not x 's sign" [7] then we could say that in the program there is non-interference between * and •. Abstract interpretation provides the most appropriate framework to further develop Cohen's intuition. The basic idea is that an observer can analyze only some properties, modeled as abstract interpretations of the concrete program semantics. In the following, the observer is a pair of abstractions η ⊛ , ρ • , as just described with
, representing what can be observed about, respectively, the input and output of a program 2 . At this point, consider φ ⊛ ∈ uco(℘(I)), it denotes a property on the input which represents when, i.e., for which inputs, we are interested in testing the non-interference property. We can say that the idea of abstract non-interference is that a program P satisfies abstract non-interference relatively to a pair of observations η ⊛ and ρ • , and to a property φ
, if, whenever the input values have the same property φ ⊛ then the best correct approximation of the semantics of P , wrt η ⊛ in input and ρ • in output, does not change. This captures precisely the intuition that φ ⊛ -indistinguishable input values provide η ⊛ , ρ • -indistinguishable results, for this reason it can still be considered a non-interference policy. The following definition introduces the notion of abstract non-interference as a generalization of the standard one.
In the following, in sake of simplicity, we will sometimes abuse notation by writing Fig. 1 ), and the program: Clearly in the standard notion of non-interference seen previously there is a flow of information from variable y to variable x , since x depends on the value of y, i.e., the statement does not satisfy non-interference.
Let us see what happens for (Sign ⊢ id)P (Par). If the input is such that Sign(y, x ) = (0+, 0+), then the possible outputs are always in 2Z, indeed the result is always even because there is a multiplication by 2. The same holds if Sign(y, x ) = (0−, 0−). Therefore any possible output value, with a fixed observable input, has the same observable abstraction in Par, which is 2Z. Hence (Sign ⊢ id)P (Par) holds.
Basic properties of ANI and blind kernels
Abstract non-interference is parametric on program properties specified as closure operators. In order to better understand the meaning of input/output abstractions in the definitions above, we can observe that the property where we cannot observe anything in input, i.e., (φ ⊛ ⊢ η ⊛ )P (⊤) always holds. Indeed, if a closure identifies some objects, then every more abstract closure will identify at least the same objects. From these simple observations we derive the following basic properties of abstract non-interference.
) and the program P ∈ Imp.
At this point, we recall the systematic methods introduced for deriving output blind observers from programs by abstract interpretation. This is useful both in automatic program certification for deriving basic assertions, and in order to classify programs in terms of the properties that make noninterference hold. Since (output) observers are characterized as abstract domains, the idea is to define an abstract domain transformer, depending on the program to be analyzed, which is able to transform any abstraction ρ • , able to observe interference, into the closest abstraction unable to observe any interference, i.e., blind. This corresponds to characterizing the most powerful blind observer for a given program. By Proposition 3.3, any refinement of an output observation that violates non-interference, still violates it. Consider a program P and an ANI property (φ
) always exists unique. We call this domain the blind kernel of ρ • for P and we denote it with the following notation:
A proof system for Abstract Non-Interference
In the previous section we recall that abstract non-interference can be defined in a general framework, where the observations are not necessarily based on the partition of data in internal and observable. In other words we consider the notion of abstract non-interference (ANI for short)
, where the input abstractions φ ⊛ and η ⊛ are on the whole input domain, while the output property can only abstract the observable data.
Note that the aim of this work is that of providing a proof system, inductive on the syntax, which allows to deduce ANI properties of a program by combining ANI properties of its syntactic components. In order to obtain this, we have first to understand how we can combine ANI properties of programs depending on the syntactic structure. Let us first understand what happens for sequential composition, namely, suppose to know that
then we wonder what we can say about c 1 ; c 2 . It is clear that, if we want to "compose" these ANI properties, the output observation of the first statement has to be the same as the input observation φ ⊛ of the second statement, and this implies that also the input selection observation φ ⊛ has to be defined only on observable data, namely has to be of the kind φ ⊛ = ⊤ * × φ • , exactly as it happens for the output observation. However, if O • = O then both φ • and ρ • are indeed of the kind φ ⊛ and ρ ⊛ , namely are defined on the whole data domains. In the following, in order to avoid confusion, we will abuse notation by writing
. In order to generate the proof system, another restriction has to be taken into account. In particular, in order to handle correctly the assignment, where the value of only one variable is modified, we have to consider only attribute independent abstractions, i.e., abstractions such that the property of a tuple is a tuple of properties, one for each element of the tuple. For example, if we have ρ( x , y ) then we have that ρ = ρ x , ρ y such that ρ( x , y ) = ρ x (x ), ρ y (y) . As we will see later on, this condition is only sufficient for making the property hold, but it is necessary in order to rewrite the ANI property of an assignment in terms only of the ANI property for the evaluation of an expression. Otherwise, in fact, the ANI property of the assignment would depend on the whole memory, and not only on the considered expression. For example, consider the simpler case where η ⊛ = id and also φ • = id
• , then (id
Clearly, in this case, if ρ • is relational, whether this property holds or not depends, not only on the evaluation of e in the different memories, but also on the relation between these evaluations and the rest of the corresponding memories, even if they remain the same. A last statement that requires particular attention is the while loop 3 . In fact, the while has the problem of opening implicit channels of information. We recall that an implicit channel is due to the dependency existing between the variables in the guard of the statement and those modified inside its body, e.g., if we consider x := 0; while y do x := 1; y := y − 1 we have an implicit flow of information from y to x , since the final value of x depends on the initial value of y. This kind of flows may violate non-interference, hence the rule for the while has to avoid them. In order to obtain this we have not to be able to distinguish, from the observation of the output, how many times (zero or more) the while body has been executed. In other words, the observable property, in this case again the same, both in input and in output, has to be an invariant of the loop, namely the execution of the body has to leave this property unchanged. For this reason we need to characterize, always inductively on the syntax, what we mean for invariant property, namely we derive the observable invariant proof system.
Proof system for observable invariants
In order to derive a proof system for non-interference, when implicit flows may occur, we need to model the properties that are invariant during the execution of programs. Intuitively, an abstraction is invariant for a program fragment P , written {ρ
• } P {ρ • }, when by observing the property ρ • of observable inputs, we are not able to observe any difference in the ρ • property of the corresponding outputs. In other words, {ρ
• } P {ρ • } means that P is observably equivalent to skip as regards the observable property ρ • . This information is essential in order to certify the lack of implicit flows relatively to an observation. These invariant abstractions are obtained with an a la Hoare proof-system, where assertions are invariant properties of the form
Invariants of expressions are parametric on a variable, the observable variable to which they can be assigned. In the Table 2 : Derivation of public invariants of programs.
following, being the closure ρ • a tuple of closures on the single variables, for each observable variable x , we denote by ρ • x the component of ρ • which is applied to x . Definition 4.1 Given an expression e in Imp and a variable x , we say that the property ρ • of the variable x is invariant in e, and we write {ρ
• } e, x {ρ
where for any expression e, e : Σ−→V is the standard semantics of expressions and where v |x is the value for x in the tuple v .
The intuition is that e does not change the property ρ • of the value of x inside v . We extend this definition of invariant properties of expressions in order to define invariant properties of statements/programs. Definition 4.2 Given a program P in the language Imp, we say that a property ρ • is an invariant in the program P , and we write {ρ
Observable invariants for programs can be derived by induction on the syntax of Imp by using the proof-system I = {I1, . . . , I7} whose rules are defined in Table 2 and explained in the following.
• Rule I1 says that the property ⊤ • = λx ∈ O • . ⊤ is invariant for any program. This holds since ⊤ • is the property unable to distinguish any difference among observable values. Therefore, any change due to the execution of a program cannot be observed through the property ⊤ • .
• Rule I2 says that any property is invariant for the program skip. This holds since skip does not change observable data, and therefore observable data properties are left unchanged.
• When we have an assignment to internal variables, then the semantics behaves like skip relatively to observable values, therefore rule I3 is similar to I2, since, by definition, invariants are defined only for observable variables.
• In I4 if a property is invariant for the evaluation of an expression as regards the observable variable x , then it is invariant for the assignment of the expression to x . Consider for example the expression x +2, then the property Sign (Fig. 1) is not invariant, since if we consider the input value x = −1, then we have that Sign(x + 2) = Sign(1) = + = Sign(x ) = −. On the other hand, we have that Par (Fig. 1) is invariant for this expression as regards the variable x , since the operation x + 2 doesn't change the parity of the value assigned to x . At this point if the statement is x := x + 2, then we have that {Par} x := x + 2 {Par}.
• Rule I5 says that the invariants distribute on the sequential composition. Hence, if for example we have the program x := x +2; y := y −1, where x is observable (x : •) and y is internal (y : * ), then we know, by I3, that {Par} y := y − 1 {Par} and by I4 that {Par} x := x + 2 {Par}. Therefore, we obtain {Par} x := x + 2; y := y − 1 {Par}.
• Rule I6 states that, given a while-statement, if a property is invariant for the body, then the same property is invariant for the whole statement. This rule holds since the only modifications of variables made by the while, are made by its body.
• Weakening (I7) says that any more abstract property of an invariant is still invariant.
A derivation in the proof-system of observable invariants in Table 2 is denoted ⊢ I . The following theorem shows that the proof system for invariants is sound as regards the given definition of invariant properties (Def. 4.2).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the rules in Table 2 . The rules I1 and I2 are trivial since the closure ⊤ • makes each element equal to the element ⊤, while skip (x ) • = x • by definition of skip and therefore for each
As regards I3, the assignment semantics guarantees that y :
. We have to prove that, with this hypothesis, ρ
Since we have that the abstraction ρ • of a tuple of values is a tuple of abstractions, then after the execution of x := e we obtain ρ
. Consider now I5 and suppose that {ρ
, so we have the thesis. I6 holds since the only modifications that the statement while x > 0 do c endw can 
, then we can prove by induction on the number of executions of c in the semantics of the while that the rule holds. In fact, the base considers 0 executions of c, namely while x > 0 do c endw = skip , and trivially we have ρ
. Suppose now that for n executions of c, the semantics of the while has ρ • as observable invariant, namely
, we have to prove that the same holds for c; while x > 0 do c endw. But combining together the hypothesis on c and the inductive hypothesis, by Rule I5, we have the thesis. Finally, I7 is straightforward from the definition of invariants. 
Proof system for abstract non-interference
We can now introduce a proof-system for abstract non-interference. We give sufficient conditions for proving that a statement satisfies abstract noninterference by inductively analyzing its sub-components. The rules of this proof system are specified in Table 3 .
• Rule R1 says that if the output observation is the property ⊤ • , then the input observation can be any. Again, this holds because ⊤ • is not able to distinguish different public data.
• Rule R2 says that skip satisfies non-interference for any possible observer such that the partition induced by input selection observation is more concrete than the one induced by the I/O observation of the program semantics. In particular, (η
This condition is necessary since in this case abstract non-interference corresponds to saying ∀x 1 ,
• Rule R3 considers a notion of non-interference extended to expressions and depending on a fixed variable to which the expression is assigned. Let us recall that, Π(ρ) denotes the partition induced by the closure ρ. Formally, we can define non-interference for expression as follows:
We can note the assignment changes only the variable x , all the other observable variables (if there are some) are left unchanged. For this reason we need the condition on the partition induced by the involved
• ) (between square brackets since it is required only when there are more than one observable variable), since for all the observable variables different from x the assignment behaves like skip, and hence we need the conditions of rule R2. Par(
This because Π(⊤) ⊑ Π(Par), and therefore ⊤(3) = ⊤(2) doesn't imply Par(3) = Par(2).
Note that this condition between the partitions induced by abstraction is not necessary when the program contains only one low variable. Consider, for instance x := y * 2 (O • = {x }), we have that (⊤ ⊢ id)y * 2(Par), namely the multiplication by 2 hides the parity property of the computed value. This implies that (⊤ ⊢ id)x := y * 2(Par).
• Rule R4 says that an assignment to an internal variable, from the observable point of view, behaves like skip, therefore for this kind of assignment the rule is like R2. This means that also in this case abstract non-interference corresponds to saying φ
• Rule R5 controls the while-statement when η ⊛ = id ⊛ . In particular {ρ
• } c {ρ • } states that the program c is not acting on the property ρ • of the observable data, namely ρ • is invariant in the execution of c, in the sense that the property ρ • of observable data is not changed by the execution of c. If this happens then the behaviour of c observed by means of ρ • is the same as the program skip, and therefore the fact that the while is executed or not is not distinguishable from an observer.
• Rule R6 shows how we can compose the non-interference properties in presence of sequential composition of programs. In particular, two programs c 1 and c 2 compose when c 1 satisfies non-interference for the output observation which is the input one that makes c 2 satisfy non-interference. Unfortunately, this is straightforward only when η ⊛ = id ⊛ , otherwise we have to require addittivity of the output observations. This is due to the fact that by definition abstract noninterference checks input properties on singletons while the output of the abstract non-interference assertion for c 1 deals with properties of sets of values. In order to cope with this 'type mismatch", we need the addittivity condition, as shown in the following example. where the values are integer and the observable variable is x . Consider the property ρ = {Z, 4Z, 4Z + 1, 4Z + 2, 4Z + 3, ∅} (not additive), then
On the other hand, it is simple to show that (ρ ⊢ id ⊛ )c 2 (ρ) since this statement leaves unchanged the abstraction of x . But if we consider the composition then we have that (⊤ ⊢ id * × ⊤ • )P (ρ) does not hold because if y ∈ 2Z then ρ( P (y, Z) • ) = ρ({4y, 4y + 1}) = Z while if y ∈ 2Z + 1 then ρ( P (y, Z) • ) = ρ({4y + 1}) = 4Z + 1. Note that the first statement does not satisfy abstract non-interference if we consider the disjunctive completion of ρ in output, namely its additive lift.
Finally, the next example shows that, whenever η ⊛ = id ⊛ , then requiring abstract non-interference to hold for c 2 is not sufficient to achieve soundness. For this reason, the rule requires abstract non-interference with η ⊛ = id ⊛ for c 2 . • Rule R7 allows to extend the results obtained with η ⊛ = id ⊛ (as it happens in rule R5) to abstract non-interference where η ⊛ = id ⊛ . This is possible only when φ • distinguishes more than (η ⊛ ) • , since intuitively this hypothesis on φ • allows to apply the semantics of the program to the same set of observable inputs.
• Rule R8 tells us that we can always move towards properties where the output observation is additive.
• Rule R9 is the consequence rule, which states that we can concretize the input observation and we can abstract the output one (see Sect 3).
• The rules R10 and R11 say that both the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of output observations making a program satisfy non-interference, still make the program satisfy non-interference. Rule R12 says that the same hold for the greatest lower bound of the selection observations when these are partitioning.
We denote by R 0 = I∪{R1, . . . , R12} the proof system for abstract noninterference. The next result specifies that the proof-system R 0 is sound.
Proof. The following implications hold:
Theorem 4.8 Let P ∈ Imp be a program and
Proof. We prove the soundness of the system inductively on the rules in Table 4 . Consider l 1 , l 2 ∈ I • and h 1 , h 2 ∈ I * . The first rule holds from Prop. 3.3 (generalization of [13] [Prop. 3.7] ), since we can always abstract the output observation. Let us consider R2. We have to prove that φ l 1 ) . Hence, the implication we require is exactly the one corresponding to the pre-condition Π(φ
. Consider R3, i.e., consider x := e with x : •. The hypothesis says that
for each x and y we have that φ
. . , x n and l 2 = y 1 , . . . , y n , with n ∈ N. For the condition above, the hypothesis φ
. Therefore the following equalities hold:
where the equality ( * ) holds since
• ) (note that the indexes from 1 to i are only the observable outputs).
• ) behaves like skip on observable variables, being x : * , hence we have the thesis. In order to show the soundness of R5 we prove {ρ
, implies non-interference for the while, namely
for any l 1 , l 2 ∈ I • and h 1 , h 2 ∈ I * such that ρ • (l 1 ) = ρ • (l 2 ). Let us denote c 1 def = while x > 0 do c endw. At this point, we have to prove, by induction on the iterations of the while, that ρ • ( c 1 (h, l) • ) = ρ • (l) for any h, l, namely we prove that this is an invariant property of the loop. If x > 0 (h, l) = false, then by definition we have that c 1 = skip and therefore we have the thesis by rule R2, being η ⊛ = id and φ • = ρ • . Suppose now that the property holds for while's with a number of loops less or equal than n, we prove it for while's with n + 1 iterations. Consider c 1 = c; c 1 where c 1 has n iterations, we can apply the inductive hypothesis on c 1 . Then
(by the hypothesis of the rule on c)
Consider rule R6. The hypotheses of the rule say that
where ( * ) holds by hypotheses and by Lemma 4.7. In R7 we have that φ
we have also to prove that the same hypothesis implies ρ • ( c (η
The following equalities hold:
where ( * ) holds since, by hypothesis φ
• and the internal part can arbitrary change by definition of noninterference.
Therefore we can conclude, from the properties of disjunctive completion, that
, namely we have non-interference. Finally R9, R10, R11 and R12 hold by a straightforward generalization of [13] [Prop. 3.7] .
2
Next example shows a simple derivation of abstract non-interference properties, possible in our proof system. where the values are naturals and x is the observable variable. First of all we note that
where {2} N def = 2 n n ∈ N , since the result is always an even number, independently from the initial value of y. This means that we can apply R3:
Consider the while-statement, denoted by c, and consider the closure operator ρ 2 def = n{2} N n ∈ N odd . We note that {ρ 2 } 2 * x , x {ρ 2 }, since the operation 2 * x does not change the property n{2} N of the initial value of x , namely it does not change the odd factor of x . Therefore, we can apply I4 to the observable assignment and I3 for the internal assignment:
and therefore by applying I5 we obtain
Now we can apply R5
and therefore we use R6:
Complete proof system
Unfortunately, the system R 0 is not complete, and in particular R6 is the rule that introduces incompleteness.
Example 4.10 Consider the property Par, and the program P in the Example 4.6, where the values are integer and the observable variable is x . Let us denote the while statement as c def = while y > 0 do x := x mod 4; y := 0 endw. We can prove that
where ρ 1 is the closure which is not able to distinguish even numbers, i.e., ρ 1 = {2Z} ∪ {n} n odd . These facts hold since the result of the assignment is always an even number multiple of 4, independently from the value of y (so the first fact holds). At this point, the while receives a multiple of 4 and therefore the result is always 0, implying the second fact. On the other hand, we have that it does not hold
since without the assignment, the while can receive any number, in particular it can receive, as inputs, numbers that are not multiples of 4. For these numbers the statement does not satisfy abstract non-interference, for instance ρ 1 ( c (0, 5)
In abstract non-interference, the systematic construction of secret kernels (see Sect.3), plays a key role for making the proof systems R 0 complete. Completeness is here achieved by respectively including the following semantic rule:
The semantic rule R0 derives from [13] [Th. 5.5] . It states that, given a program c and the input observations φ • and η ⊛ we can derive the most concrete output observation that makes the program satisfy abstract noninterference. This corresponds precisely to finding the strongest post-condition (viz., the most concrete abstract domain) for the program c with precondition φ • and η ⊛ , such that abstract non-interference holds. This is a "semantic rule", because it involves the construction of the abstract domain (φ • ⊢ η ⊛ ) c (id), which is equivalent to compute the concrete semantics of the command c. However, this rule allows us to include in the abstract noninterference proof, assertions which can be systematically derived as an abstract domain transformation. The idea is to use this rule for deriving some starting properties, for example for expressions, or for some simple statements, and then to use the proof system for deriving the non-interference property for the whole program. Let R = R 0 ∪ {R0}. It is clear that rule R0 makes the proof systems R complete.
Corollary 4.11
The proof-systems R is complete. 
ANI for non-deterministic systems
In the following, we consider the simple imperative language with non deterministic choice, Nd-Imp, introduced in Sec. 2.3. As usual P denotes the input/output relation for the program P also in the non-deterministic case, therefore P (s) denotes the set of all the states reachable by executing P starting from the state s.
In this context, consider the notion of possibilistic non-interference [25] for non-deterministic programs: A program is secure if given two states s 1
. This notion can be formulated as in Def. 3.1 with only semantic difference that now P (s) L is a set of values instead of a single value. Anyway, the generalization is not so straightforward. Indeed if we don't consider additive closures for the output observation, the notion of non-interference as given above, is not precise. In fact, missing addittivity means that the property of a set is not the union of the properties of its elements. In the context of non-interference, this means that the collection of all the observations of the single computations, does not correspond to the observation of the set of all the possible results. Indeed, we recall that possibilistic non-interference is based on the assumption that the attacker can observe and collect all the possible system behaviours. Therefore, if it is able to observe the property ρ • of the output, then the natural non-deterministic extension of abstract non-interference would say that the attacker can collect the set of all the ρ • observations of the possible system behaviours, which is in general different from the ρ • property of the set of all the possible system behaviours. Therefore, in order to define abstract non-interference for non-deterministic systems simply by considering the non-deterministic denotational semantics as defined by Cousot [8] , we have to consider only additive properties for the output observation. Therefore, when ρ • is additive, i.e. ρ • = (ρ • ), we define abstract non-interference exactly as we have done for deterministic systems, as follows:
Exactly as it happens in the deterministic case, we have to require some restrictions on φ ⊛ in order to guarantee the sequential compositionality of the abstract non-interference properties. Hence, also in this case, φ ⊛ can only select observable data, and therefore it has the form φ ⊛ = ⊤ * × φ • , and we choose to explicitly denote only the observable part, using exactly the same notation as in the deterministic case.
We now extend the proof system for deterministic programs in order to cope with non-deterministic ones. We first derive the rule for the nondeterministic choice in the proof system I:
Rule I8 controls the non-deterministic choice in a rather standard way. Indeed, it says that an invariant property for a non-deterministic choice is the most abstract invariant among the ones for all the programs involved in the non-deterministic choice. At this point we have to modify the proof system R. The problem here is that it is not sufficient to add the rule for nondeterministic choice, since the fact that the denotational semantics returns a set of values instead of a singleton induces some new considerations on the rule R6.
Example 4.12 Consider the program:
with typing: t = h : * , l : • . Consider the property observing the modulus in the division by 4: ρ = {Z, 4Z, 4Z + 1, 4Z + 2, 4Z + 3, ∅} (not additive), then we can show that
On the other hand, it is simple to show that (ρ ⊢ id ⊛ )c 2 (ρ) since the abstraction of l does not depend on h. But if we consider the composition then we have that (⊤ ⊢ id ⊛ )P (ρ) does not hold because
while rule R6 would infer that (⊤ ⊢ id ⊛ )P (ρ) holds, and the problem lies on the fact that ρ is not additive.
Therefore we replace rule R6 with R ′ 6 R ′ 6:
We can observe that rule R8 becomes useless since, in the non-deterministic context, we need output additive observations, and this means that we have no distinction between ρ • and (ρ • ). Finally, we introduce the rule R13 for the non-deterministic choice.
R13
:
R13 says that, if we have a non-deterministic choice among the elements of a set of programs, then this non-deterministic choice satisfies non-interference for the observer characterized, in input, by the greatest lower bound of input observations for which the elements of the set satisfy non-interference, and in output by the least upper bound of output observations of the same elements.
For instance, note that if we have c def = l := 2 * h l := 2h + l, where it is worth noting that, if ρ = {2Z} ∪ {n} n odd , we obtain (ρ ⊢ id ⊛ )l := 2 * h(ρ) and (Par ⊢ id ⊛ )l := 2h + l(Par). Clearly the execution of c has to guarantee non interference independently from the statement that is executed, so we have (ρ ⊢ id ⊛ )c(Par). For all the other rules we have simply to add the requirement that the output observations are additive when the program is non-deterministic.
Lemma 4.13 Let ρ and η additive and (η ⊢ id
Proof. Being ρ additive we have
Since also η is additive, we have that η(
. Namely we have that
since (η ⊢ id ⊛ )P (ρ). Viceversa we can prove the other inclusion in a similar way, therefore we have that
2 Theorem 4.14 The proof system R Nd
(where the addittivity condition on the output observation is added to all the rules) is sound and the proof system R Nd def = R Nd 0 ∪ {R0} is complete.
Proof. The completeness is straightforward by the presence of the rule R0 (see Corollary 4.11) . Correctness of I8 is straightforward from rule I7. In order to prove correctness of R ′ 6 we have to show that whenever the premises of the rule hold then the consequence holds as well. Consider ρ • and ρ • 1 additive, namely
, the following equality hold:
and so we have non-interference. R13 is sound since i c i∈I = c k for some k ∈ I , and (φ
5 An application to language-based security
In this section, we focus on the instantiation, of the proof system for abstract non-interference, to the context of language-based security. In particular, the idea is to derive a proof system for each abstract non-interference notion introduced in [13] : Narrow and Abstract Non-Interference. The fact that we are considering security adds a new constraint on the considered abstractions: in this case also η ⊛ is an attribute independent abstraction, namely it is composed by an internal (here private, denoted H) and observable (here public, denoted L) part. In other words, it cannot describe relations between internal and observable data. Moreover, in sake of simplicity, we only consider deterministic programs. In this way, we have only two cases. The first one is narrow (abstract) non-interference, which consists in considering an observer (here called attacker) that can only observe the I/O behaviour of programs by means of an abstraction φ • in input and an abstraction ρ • in output. In this case, the property η ⊛ is the identity, since the semantics of programs is abstracted only in the output. The other case is called abstract non-interference (for security) and it considers η • = φ • and η * = id * . Namely we characterise again the attacker with only two abstractions, an input and an output one, and for this reason the input observational capability of the attacker is the same in the selection of the inputs and in the observation of data.
Note that, the restrictions we introduced in the general framework on φ ⊛ imply the impossibility to consider declassification (via allowing) [19, 3] in our proof system. Declassified abstract non-interference (via allowing) considers an abstraction of private input characterising what private property we allow to flow in the observable part. This abstraction, in our context corresponds to φ * . In this case, for example narrow abstract non-interference becomes:
At this point, it is possible to verify that this notion is not compositional wrt sequential composition, exactly as we noticed in the general case. This observation, therefore, excludes the possibility of generating a similar proof system for this kind of declassified abstract non-interference. Table 4 : Axiomatic narrow (abstract) non-interference
The things are different for the other kind of declassification introduced in the context of abstract non-interference [13, 19] : Declassification via blocking. In this case we have again an abstraction on the private input, but it represents what we don't want to flow in the observable data. In our context this corresponds to the property η * . Namely, abstract non-interference declassified via blocking is precisely the property (φ • ⊢ η * × φ • )P (ρ • ), which perfectly fits in the general proof system introduced in the previous section, simply with some restrictions on η ⊛ .
Proof system for Narrow (Abstract) Non-Interference
Consider first the situation where the observer can only observe, and therefore abstract, the I/O behaviour of the program. In particular, we have the input observation of the input, which is φ • , and the output observation ρ • , while we do not have an abstraction of the semantics in input, namely η ⊛ = id ⊛ . In sake of simplicity, and for coherence with previous works [13] we call this particular instantiation narrow, and we denote it [φ • ]P (ρ • ). In the following we explain the meaning of the different rules in this particular context, and we show how certain rules change due to the new constraints. Moreover, being in the context of security, the internal data will be called private and denoted as H, while the observable data will be called public and denoted L.
Rules from R N 1 to R N 4 and from R N 8 to R N 12 are trivial instantiations of the corresponding rules in R, with the only observation that, being
In R N 6 we lose the addittivity condition, since here we consider only η ⊛ = id ⊛ . R N 5 is exactly R5, while we have not the instantiation of R7 since this rule becomes meaningless when η ⊛ = id ⊛ . We denote by R N 0 = I ∪ {R N 1, . . . , R N 11} the proof system for (narrow) abstract non-interference. where ρ 1 is the closure which is not able to distinguish even numbers, i.e., ρ 1 = {2Z} ∪ {n} n odd . Therefore, by R N 3, we obtain [⊤]l := 2 * h(ρ 1 ) (note that, since there is only one low variable we ignore the condition Π(η) ⊑ Π(ρ)). Consider now the while-statement. We note that the operation l +2 leaves unchanged the parity of l, this means that if the input is even the the output is even, and similarly if it is odd. Namely for each n such that Par(n) = Par(l) then Par( l + 2 (h, n)) = Par(n + 2) = Par(n) = Par(l). Therefore {Par} l + 2, l {Par} which implies {Par} l + 2, l {Par}
Therefore, by I5, we have that {Par} l := l + 2; h := h − 1 {Par}. Now we can apply rule R N 6 obtaining
Finally, note that ρ 1 ⊑ Par hence by R N 8 we have also that [⊤] l := 2 * h(Par), therefore we can apply rule R N 6 and we obtain that [⊤]P (Par).
Proof system for Abstract Non-Interference
Consider now the situation where the observer can also analyse the code, and therefore abstract, the semantics of the program. In particular, we have the input observation φ • , which corresponds to the input analysis of the semantics, i.e., η • = φ • , and the output observation ρ • , while we do not have an abstraction of the private input semantics, namely η * = id * . In sake of simplicity, and for coherence with previous works [13] we call this particular instantiation generically abstract, and we denote it (φ
In the following we explain the meaning of the different rules in this particular context, and we show how certain rules change due to the new constraints.
Rules R A 1, R A 9, R A 11 e R A 12 are trivial instantiations of the corresponding rules in R. Also the rules from R A 3 to R A 6 are trivial instantiations of the corresponding rules, noting that ρ
As far as the while is concerned the new constraints allow to be more precise. In particular rule R5 can be instantiated only when the guard is private, namely when implicit flows are possible. Instead, when the guard is public, we can consider a new weaker rule R A 5bis. This rule was not possible before, because the possible difference between φ • and η • could cause deceptive interference [13] . Table 5 : Axiomatic abstract non-interference
The following example shows the difference between narrow and abstract non-interference properties for loops. h 2 , 3) ). This means that, in the general case, even if the guard is observable we need the condition about invariant properties. Consider now (Sign)P (Par). Then Par(
Hence, in the abstract case we can be more precise removing the invariant condition when the guard is observable.
R A 8 is meaningless, talking only of narrow non-interference. Finally R9 is not applicable here, where φ ⊛ = η ⊛ , because requires the independence between φ ⊛ and η ⊛ , since in the rule φ ⊛ can change while η ⊛ remain fixed. The proof-system for abstract non-interference in Table 5 is denoted R A 0 = R N 0 ∪ {R A 1, . . . , R A 12}.
Theorem 5.3 Let P ∈ Imp be a program and η, ρ ∈ uco(V L ), such that ρ = ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n , where n = x ∈ Var x : L . If ⊢ A 0 (η)P (ρ) then (η)P (ρ).
Proof. Clearly, all the rules but R A 5bis are trivial instantiations of the corresponding rules in the system R, hence we inherit their soundness. We have only to prove soundness of R A 5bis. Consider (φ 
where ( * ) holds by hypothesis on c, and ( * * ) holds by hypothesis, i.e., φ • (l 1 ) = φ • (l 2 ) . 2
The following example shows that also the proof-system R A 0 for abstract non-interference in Table 5 is not complete. The example above shows that A5 introduces incompleteness in the system, but it is not the only such a rule. In particular, by the same argument used in Example 4.10 for R6, R A 6 introduces also incompleteness. Even R A 5bis introduces incompleteness, since the guard of the while can avoid interferences that may happen in the body, as shown in the following example. But it is worth noting that (ρ)P (ρ) since, for example, ρ( P (h, 0, 2Z 0 ) L ) = 0, 2Z 0 and ρ( P (h, 2Z 0 , 2Z 0 ) L ) = 0, 0 .
The next example shows that R A 0 is strictly weaker than R N 0 . We show that if [ since Par is disjunctive, and therefore we can infer (Sign)P (Par).
Discussion
In this paper we have introduced a proof system for abstract non-interference, in the general context where we are interested in understanding how data of two different groups interfere with each other. The advantage of a proofsystem for abstract non-interference is that checking abstract non-interference inductively on the syntax can be easily mechanized. The proof system can benefit of standard abstract interpretation methods for generating basic certificates for simple program fragments (rules R0). The other rules allow us to combine certificates from program fragments in a proof-theoretic certification of non-interference for programs. It is clear that our proof system is a system for certification and not for the generation of harmless attackers, since the rules are general and holds for all the abstractions satisfying the fixed restrictions. An analogous proof system which instead allow to generate input or output observations for abstract non-interference can be easily derived as instantiation by fixing for each rule a possible input or output observation that we choose wrt a fixed strategy. Namely, fixed the input [output] observation we can derive a system where we choose only one output [input] abstraction in the set of all the domains that satisfy the rule. Depending on the kind of application we can clearly decide the strategy for choosing such a witness and this deserves further research. Anyway, the interest in the general technology we propose in this paper is mostly related with its use in a la proof carrying code (PCC) verification of abstract noninterference, when mobile code is allowed. In this case in a PCC architecture, the code producer may create an abstract non-interference certificate that attests to the fact that the code non-interference cannot be violated by the corresponding model of the observer. Then the code consumer may validate the certificate to check that the foreign code is not violating non-interference for the corresponding model of observer. The implementation of this technology requires an appropriate choice of a logic for specifying abstractions and an adequate logical framework where the logic can be manipulated. We believe that predicate abstraction [12] is a fairly simple and easily mechanizable way for reasoning about abstract domains. More appropriate logics can be designed following the ideas in [2] , even though a mechanizable logic for reasoning about abstractions is currently a major challenge in this field and deserves further investigations. The language we used is quite simple. Even though abstract non-interference makes non-interference a purely semantic problem, any extension of Imp and its semantics with for example probabilistic choice, non terminating computations, and concurrency, may require a redesign of the proof-systems for abstract non-interference. It would be particularly interesting to extend Imp with concurrency. In the context of language-based security, the main interest in this extension deals both with the chance to reduce protocol verification to non-interference problems and with the possibility of modeling active attackers as abstract interpretations. The models of attackers developed in abstract non-interference are indeed passive [13] . Active attackers would be particularly relevant in order to extend abstract non-interference as a language-based tool for protocol validation.
